

Chapter 12

Captured Enemy Ammunition

This chapter discusses organizations that have an interest in CEA reporting procedures and unit responsibilities. The management of CEA is an integral part of the TECHINT mission. It supports the tactical commander's effort to fight and win the battle. Evaluation of CEA provides valuable data to the commander that helps in countering the enemy's technological advantage. Exploitation of CEA and TECHINT reporting is a major part of the all-source intelligence effort. It involves everyone from the individual soldier to policy makers and all levels of command. Often, the TECHINT process begins when one soldier finds something new on the battlefield and takes steps to report it. The information or CEA is evaluated and frequently exploited at progressively higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the enemy advantage.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

12-1. In the 1920s, Germany developed weapons and weapon systems that would be used against the allies in the 1940s. The allied nations did not include TECHINT in intelligence collection efforts. As a result, German scientific and technical advances went largely unnoticed. By the time information did come to light and was made available to Washington and London, it was ignored. These weapons were used during World War II with devastating results.

WORLD WAR II

12-2. During the air battle for Europe, the British used TECHINT to counter the German anti-aircraft and night fighter defenses. They did this by exploiting captured aircraft radios and a captured radar station. This collection led to the publishing of new technical material, to include the following:

- Technical manuals and handbooks on enemy weapons.
- Training aids.
- Updates to handbooks on the German and Italian armies.

The US started a successful TECHINT program in the fall of 1943, but abandoned the program immediately after the war.

KOREAN WAR

12-3. At the beginning of the Korean War, the US finally discovered it had little hard data on enemy weapon systems. The DOD realized that TECHINT had to be ongoing if effective countermeasures were to be developed. Once again, TECHINT was established.

